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The increasing politicalization of the large American corporation, illus-
trated by numerous current developments, is primarily the product of
changing concepts of the role of business in the society, set against a back-
ground of profound unresolved problems in the society itself. It is a process
that reflects a number of important elements: the intensity of the social and
environmental crisis; the central role of the corporation in the American
society; the lack of accountability of corporate management; the techno-
logical revolution in communications; a growing concern about the lack of
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1942, Harvard Law School. Member of the New York and Massachusetts bar.
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Corporation given by Professor Blumberg at the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, April 1, 1971. Copyright 1971. Except for minor revisions and inclusion of
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responsiveness of political institutions coupled with a recognition of the
sensitivity of business to public opinion; changing personal and social
values; and the existence of substantial potential support available from
non-profit and other institutions and from millions of new small share-
holders. In the aggregate, these elements make the large public corporation
an appealing and vulnerable target for groups interested in social reform,
who see the corporation as one of the major power centers in the society,
and who hope to utilize the corporation as an instrument of social progress
and the corporate voting process as a vehicle to dramatize their objectives
and to force public debate.
This article is concerned with the development of a view of the corpora-
tion that is political, not legal; a view that looks upon the corporation as
a social institution to be subjected to social controls, not as an economic
organization to be operated to achieve economic objectives for shareholders.,
This increasingly popular view of the corporation is characterized by em-
phasis on social and economic power, the degree of responsiveness to public
demand, the extent of representation of consumer and minority groups,
and the complete absence of reference to the economic objectives of the
corporation and the interests of its shareholders.
I. THE MANIFESTATIONS OF POLITICALIZATION
Politicalization of the large public corporation is the involvement of the
corporation in issues of high public visibility, assuring the controversy a
prominent place in the press, radio and television. These issues are essen-
tially social, moral or political in their nature. They do not promote, and
may in fact impair, the profitability of corporate operations, and are of
interest to the proponents primarily as citizens, rather than as shareholders.
Politicalization of the corporation is reflected in a variety of ways:
(1) Angry confrontations or disruptions at shareholder meetings. 2
(2) Picketing, sit-ins, demonstrations and boycotts.3
(3) Bombings, sabotage and burnings.4
1 Thus The New Republic recently inquired:
What about the vast powers that corporations exercise directly over people's lives
and livelihood? How responsive are these great dominions to popular wishes, and how
representative are they of those they presumably serve and from whom they profit?
The New Republic, Feb. 20, 1971, at 9.
2 Disruptions have already occurred at the shareholder meetings of American Telephone,
Alcan Aluminium, Bank of America, Boeing Aircraft, Bulova Watch, The Chase Man-
hattan Bank, Columbia Broadcasting, Commonwealth Edison, Dow Chemical, FMC Cor-
poration, General Electric, General Motors, Gulf Oil, Honeywell, International Business
Machines, Chas. Pfizer, Union Carbide and United Aircraft. Some corporate critics feel
demonstrations and disruptions at annual meetings are self-defeating and that concen-
tration on proxy proposals and solicitations is preferable. Bus. Week, Feb. 13, 1971, at
86, 87.
8 Events of this nature have been directed at The Chase Manhattan Bank, Eastman
Kodak, Firestone Rubber, Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company and Polaroid.
4 Attacks have been made upon the Bank of America, The Chase Manhattan Bank,
Dow Chemical, International Business Machines, General Telephone, General Electric,
Mobil Oil and Standard Oil of New Jersey. The Bank of America has been the subject
of 22 bombings and 17 burnings since Feb. 1970. N.Y. Times, May 16, 1971, at 53, col. I.
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(4) Harassment and interference with employment recruiters on univer-
sity campuses.5
(5) Demands for the election of blacks, women and other minority-
group representatives on boards of directors.
(6) Organization of public interest groups, in some cases financed by
tax-exempt foundations, investigating the extent of corporate recog-
nition of social and moral factors in business operations.6
(7) Increasing use of the proxy machinery to compel management, under
SEC Rule 14a-8, 7 to include social and political questions or pro-
posals for change in the organic corporate structure in the corporate
proxy statements.8
One knowledgeable observer of developments in this area has pointed out
that this movement in the corporate world could become the most signifi-
cant political development of the 1970's.9
As a major factor in the society, the corporation cannot escape involve-
ment in the urgent problems of the country. It is by necessity profoundly
influenced by the widespread dissatisfaction on the part of significant ele-
ments of the American society, the same dissatisfaction that is reflected in
the violence of the social scene, the intensity of concern and national con-
flict engendered by the war in Vietnam, the preoccupation with problems
of environmental abuse, the development of "consumerism," the aliena-
tion of many younger persons from traditional values and the existence of
"revolutionary" movements for "liberation" of blacks and women. These
factors have set in motion vital social forces and have inspired energetic,
highly articulate, fiercely motivated persons, prepared to devote their ener-
gies to the furtherance of the movement; 1970 has thus been described as
5 Honeywell and Dow Chemical have experienced such interference. The latter was
subject to 221 major demonstrations on American college campuses in four years. Address
by C. Gerstacker, Chairman of the Board of Dow Chemical Co., to New York Financial
Writers, June 3, 1970, at 1. For a detailed review of the Dow Chemical experience on
campuses see S. Strethi, Up Against the Corporate Wall 236-53 (1971).
6 The Public Affairs Council has published a 28-page directory of "organizations dedi-
cated to changing the private sector," many of which are directing their activities at
corporations. These include, for example, the Project for Corporate Responsibility and
the Center for the Study of Responsive Law, the Council on Economic Priorities, the
Southern Africa Task Force, the Industrial Areas Foundation, the Council for Corporate
Review, and the Public Interest Center. R. Celler, The Challengers (1971).
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1970).
8 Such proposals have been included in the proxy statements for the annual meeting
of companies such as American Metal Climax, American Telephone, Dow Chemical, du
Pont, General Motors, Gulf Oil, Honeywell, Kennecott Copper and Phelps Dodge.
9 See Henderson, Politics by Other Means, The Nation, Dec. 14, 1970, at 617.
These "activist" developments have been paralled by a serious reexamination of the
corporate electoral process on the academic level. Several scholarly and forcefully reasoned
presentations have appeared recently arguing for the desirability of sweeping changes in
the entire corporate voting process, e.g., Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations:
Critical Reflections on the Rule of "One Share, One Vote," 56 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1970);
Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1489 (1970), and
for reform of SEC Rule 14a-8 to broaden the availability of the proxy solicitation machinery
for use by socially and politically motivated groups, Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy
Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 421, 520-29 (1971).
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"the year of the 'corporate guerrilla fighter.' "10 These persons regard 'the
state as the corporate state, and the corporation as a prime target.
II. THE FORCES FOR POLITICALIZATION
Business has not anticipated the increased social responsibilities de-
manded by an aroused public. In consequence, it now faces the onslaught
of demands that have great appeal in terms of commonly accepted views
of social justice, and that are being presented in a process which is leading
to a major degree of politicalization in the activities and objectives of the
major American corporation.
There are at least eight major factors contributing to the current re-
examination of the fundamentals of the role of American business in
society.
A. The Failure of Business Leadership
The basic explanation for the strength of this movement is that many
of the demands are morally sound and that business leadership, although
recognizing its theoretical responsibility, has been, along with the rest of
the society, unpardonably slow to respond in practice. The social and envi-
ronmental problems of the country would have developed however far-
sighted business leadership might have been in anticipating them and par-
ticipating in their solution. The slowness of business to respond, however, in
addition to its own role in the creation of racial injustice and environmental
abuse, has contributed to putting business in the painful position of being
a prime target in the movement for reform. The intensity of these prob-
lems, the extent to which corporations have caused them, the limited
response of corporations to their solution-in brief, the failure of business
leadership-have accelerated the forces for politicalization."
B. Changing Concepts of the Role of Business in Society
The movement for politicalization is inescapably intertwined with the
widespread acceptance by businessmen, as well as by the public generally,
of the theoretical concept of corporate social responsibility. 12 This is an
acknowledgement that business cannot avoid involvement in the problems
of the social climate in which it must operate, and that for a variety of
reasons, which I have analyzed in considerable detail elsewhere,13 it is
"good business" to participate in their solution. Indeed, one of the most
significant developments on the recent American scene has been the in-
creased public expectations and demands on American business with re-
spect to its role in the society, the increased involvement of the large public
10 Schwartz, supra note 9, at 421 & n.2; N.Y. Times, May 22, 1970, at 18, col. 8.
11 As Mr. Dan Lufkin has put it: "In almost every sphere of social concern, the corpo-
ration which is so bright and capable in its field of technical competence, has been
sluggish, inept and unresponsive." Address by Dan W. Lufkin, Is the Corporation Dead?,
to the Connecticut Council of the New England Council, Sept. 22, 1970.
12 See Newsweek, May 24, 1971, at 74-85; Bus. Week, Mar. 6, 1971, at 51-62; Bus. Week,
May 1, 1971, at 76-78.
is Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 50 B.U.L. Rev. 157 (1970).
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corporation in social problem solving, and the widespread emergence, both
among businessmen generally and among the critics of business, of a chang-
ing concept of business objectives, reflecting the changing values of a so-
ciety in transition.
With the encouragement of government, major American business is
widely involved in efforts directed toward solution of the major social
problems of the times. Business participation in the area of urban prob-
lems, poverty, race relations, environmental problems, as well as in the
more traditional philanthropic areas of aid to education, science, and local
and national charities, has become a commonplace aspect of business opera-
tions. A simple overriding objective to make money for shareholders is
increasingly being replaced by affirmations of businessmen that their basic
role is to serve society as well as to make money. Businessmen-prominent
and powerful-are increasingly speaking in such terms.14 One may inquire
whether the felicitous rhetoric is intended to serve more a public relations
function than an accurate definition of corporate priorities. The vital sig-
nificance of such statements is that the object of service to the society which
such business spokesmen are applying to business will inevitably become
the objective which the public will first accept as an appropriate role for
business, subsequently come to expect, and ultimately demand.15 Having
encouraged the public to expect that service to society accompanies and
may even transcend the pursuit of profit, businessmen will find that the
public will increasingly demand that business perform in accordance with
the new business ethic, enunciated not merely by social reformers, but by
business leaders themselves.
Common factors thus create pressures both for corporate social respon-
sibility and the politicalization of the corporation. This does not mean,
however, that if business ignored the public acceptance-expectation-demand
process, and refused to involve itself in the solution of social problems, the
pressures for politicalization would disappear. Quite the contrary. If there
is any factor that is contributing strength to the position of management
in resisting efforts to politicalize the corporation, it is the ability to point
to a record, albeit limited, of social participation. Thus, the first response
of General Motors to Campaign GM Round I was the distribution of a
22-page booklet setting forth the activities of General Motors in the very
areas it was accused of ignoring.'6 Business' best answer is its sensitivity and
14 Statements made by the Chairmen of the Boards of two of America's largest corpora-
tions are indicative: B.R. Dorsey, Chairman of Gulf Oil Corp., in an address to the
Pittsburgh chapter of the National Association of Accountants: "Today, maximum
financial gain, the historical number one objective, is forced into second place whenever
it conflicts with the well being of society," Bus. & Soc'y, Aug. 25, 1970, at 3, and J.M.
Roche, Chairman of General Motors Corp.: "This corporation and every other must serve
the society in which it operates. GM responds to society's expectations." General Motors
Corp., Progress in Areas of Public Concern 33 (Feb. 1971); Time, July 20, 1970, at 62-68.
15 See Blumberg, supra note 13, at 206.
16 General Motors Corp., GM's Record of Progress in Automotive Safety, Air Pollution
Control, Mass Transit, Plant Safety, Social Welfare (1970).
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response to society's needs and demands, not the pretense, which even
Professor Milton Friedman no longer shares, that the conduct of business
can reflect only short-run economic objectives. 17 Reduction of social par-
ticipation would certainly result in a strengthening, not a weakening of
the politicalization movement.
C. The Lack of Accountability of Management
Increased public concern with the activities and objectives of business
also arises from the fundamental organic problem of the large public cor-
poration-the essential lack of accountability of corporate management
resulting from the widespread distribution of stock ownership and the
effective separation of ownership from control.' 8
The recognition that for practical purposes boards of directors are self-
perpetuating trustees, only theoretically responsible to shareholders who
are not in a position to assert effectively the control allocated to them
under corporate law, has produced at least two major consequences. First,
deep concern has arisen over the legitimacy of corporate power that is not
realistically derived from the consent of the shareholders. This lack of stand-
ing also makes it difficult for management to speak with effectiveness on
behalf of the owners of the enterprise. Second, the theoretical owners, the
shareholders, lacking traditional aspects of control over the subject of their
property interests, have typically become temporary investors, strongly in-
clined, in the face of problems, to sell their shares.
It is recognized that there are some offsetting factors which provide outer
limits to management's lack of accountability. The threat of take-overs,
shareholder dissatisfaction with unfavorable market action of the shares,' 9
and possible future participation in corporate decision-making by large
institutional investors may provide a limited safety valve in the system.
These, however, are not particularly effective or significant, leaving the basic
limitations on the power of management self-imposed.
Accountability by management to shareholders would clearly not end
the matter, but lack of accountability to shareholders or anyone else,
renders even more troublesome an already difficult problem.
D. The Concentration of Corporate Economic Power
A further factor is the concentration of enormous economic power in
the major corporations. In 1970, the 500 largest industrial corporations
17 After starting with a position years ago that corporate social responsibility was a
dangerous, even "subversive," concept, interfering with the optimum allocation of re-
sources through the market mechanism, M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 13 (1962),
Professor Friedman has come to recognize that public attitudes shape the climate in which
business must operate, that good public relations may require such participation in the
solution of social problems or the support of philanthropic activities, and that the
resulting good will may justify the expenditure. Friedman, The Social Responsibility of
Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970 § 6 (Magazine), at 32.
18 A. Berle & G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 47-118 (1932).
19 See Manne, The "Higher Criticism" of the Modern Corporation, 62 Colum. L. Rev.
399, 410-18 (1962).
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represented approximately 65 percent of the total sales and 74 percent of the
total net profits of all industrial companies in the country. 20 Large business
has become so powerful in the society that it is not realistic for persons
concerned with social change to consider programs which do not involve
either business participation or a change in business objectives. The com-
bination of great economic power and a management that is essentially
unaccountable to shareholders21 has made the large public corporation
particularly vulnerable; it is a major social force subject to insufficient
external controls. 22
E. The Communications Revolution
The technological revolution in communications is of major importance.
With the development of television, activities which in the past might
have remained obscure today achieve national and even international
prominence. The media now provides instant publicity for "confrontation"
politics or "corporate guerrilla" activities. Public exposure is not only es-
sential for such tactics, but it is a particularly effective weapon against
business, which regards good public relations as an area of fundamental
importance, and to which a "bad press" is a matter of deep concern. 28 Pub-
licity is a primary objective of the activists, and one that is readily attained.
F. Lack of Responsiveness of the Political System
Political institutions of the society have not proved sufficiently responsive,
and they have successfully resisted, in many aspects, the impact of social
reform groups. Persons disappointed with the inability of left-of-center
forces to develop a major voice in party machinery and in the electoral
process generally have been influenced to turn elsewhere. As the result of
the search for a more vulnerable target, the corporation, rather than the
political structure, has increasingly become the recipient of the political
goals and pressures of various youth, anti-war, anti-pollution, anti-racist
and consumer-oriented organizations. 24
20 Fortune, May 1971, at 170-71.
21 See p. 430 supra.
22 How has the corporate system, nevertheless, maintained public acceptance? A variety
of factors have been responsible. The superb success of the American industrial system
in increasing employment to 78.6 million jobs, Wall St. Journal, Mar. 1, 1971, at 1,
col. 7, and in contributing to a gross national product in excess of $1,000 billion dollars,
an increasing sense of professionalism on the part of corporate managers, a sense of trustee-
ship on the part of many public directors, an apparent responsiveness to public opinion,
federal corporate law requirements for full disclosure in the issuance of securities and
limiting "insider" and "short-swing" trading, and the salutary provisions of the New York
Stock Exchange protecting the position of shareholders in listed companies beyond the
requirements of state and federal law. See N.Y. Stock Exch., Listing Procedure 43-48
(Jan. 1970); J. Livingston, The American Stockholder 178-95 (1958); Schneider & Manko,
Going Public-Practice, Procedure and Consequences, 15 Vill. L. Rev. 283 (1970), these had
all contributed, until very recently, to a general public acceptance that major reform of the
corporation was not necessary.
23 See Henderson, supra note 9, at 618.
24 At a conference of social activists held at Carnegie-Mellon University in April 1970,
the keynote speaker, Professor Staughton Lynd, summarized: "Our inevitable enemy in
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G. Changing Values
Changing views of the nature and role of the corporation are also un-
questionably derived from changing personal and social values, particularly
among younger people. Hostility by many young people to the large corpora-
tions, and to the values which they represent is a well-known development.
It is reflected in the increased difficulties in attracting qualified persons to
business and in the changing attitudes toward big business, found even in
such unlikely groups as business administration students.
It is thus not an accident that most of the persons active in Campaign GM
and other campaigns for politicalization of the corporation are surprisingly
young, or that the General Motors 1970 Annual Meeting was described by
Business Week as follows: "But it was youth, effectively organized by Cam-
paign GM, that held the attention."2 5
H. Development of a Socially Oriented Shareholder Power Base
The large corporation has developed a number of different shareholder
constituencies, 26 providing a responsive audience to pressures for social re-
form. In recent years, there has been a tremendous accumulation of stock
ownership by non-profit institutions---churches, foundations and universi-
ties2 7-which, by their nature, are particularly sensitive to social issues and
non-economic values. There has been a similar accumulation of stock owner-
ship by other institutional investors-retirement funds, mutual funds and
insurance companies, and the trust departments of banks and trust com-
panies28-who are becoming increasingly aware of changing concepts in the
nature of their responsibilities in voting their shares. Finally, the wide-
spread diversification of stock ownership among 31.9 million Americans,2 9
most of whom have a very small economic interest in the companies in
which they hold shares,3 0 clearly embraces many individuals who will be
ready to respond to social appeals. In the aggregate, the foregoing groups
present a formidable base of potential support for movements seeking to
change the emphasis of corporate objectives and priorities.
III. THE NATURE OF THE CORPORATE POLITICAL STRUGGLE
Because of the primary importance of the business institution in Ameri-
can society, the normal operations of business at home and abroad neces-
the coming years is the corporation," and Business Week reported that "the underlying
theme of the gathering was that the corporation is replacing the university and the
government as the scapegoat of radical dissatisfaction with American society." Bus. Week,
Apr. 11, 1970, at 23.
25 Bus. Week, May 30, 1970, at 84. As Anthony Athos points out: "The young, with
their radical perception of the world, are destined to shake business, as they are shaking
other institutions." Athos, Is the Corporation Next to Fall?, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb.
1970, at 49.
.26 See p. 438 infra.
27 See notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
28 Id.
29 N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1971, at 49, col. 1; N.Y. Stock Exch., Shareownership-1970,
1 (1971).
30 See pp. 455-56 infra.
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sarily involve it in issues that may be regarded as possessing qualities that
rise above the purely economic and that to many possess moral or political
significance. Business is thus asked to participate in certain activities, or
to refrain from others, because of the alleged morality or immorality of
the conduct involved or because of its significance to the local community,
the nation or the international society. The objectives of these demands
reflect the social and environmental crisis: elimination of pollution, more
effective hiring and promotion for minority groups, operation or financing
of business in the Union of South Africa, in colonial areas such as Portu-
guese Africa or in Communist countries, the manufacture of napalm and
other anti-personnel weapons for use in Indochina, product safety and
minority-group representation on the boards of directors.
The tactics of the proponents of these demands are intended to attract
public attention and provoke public debate; it is an effort to arouse public
interest to a level of intensity that will force corporate management to re-
spond. It is a battle for publicity, waged primarily in the communications
media, to influence the state of mind of citizens generally. The corporate
electoral process, in and of itself, is not decisive. It does, however, have a
basic usefulness; it provides a platform for public presentation of the point
of view of the protesting group, a device for obtaining public exposure and
a medium for involvement of interested persons.8 ' Thus, the Social Criteria
Committee of the Episcopal Church, in recommending the "use of proxies
to raise particular social and ecological issues," acknowledged that:
[n]o small part of our purpose is to raise some vital issues and bring
them into the forum of public opinion. More important than the per-
centage of the vote won in any proxy solicitation is the raising of these
questions to the level of public debate.32
A basic difficulty of many of the social reform proposals is that they have
been made to attract public attention to social problems and have little
relation to the advancement of the economic interests of the corporation
or its shareholders. Further, they have on occasion been made by groups
who have become stockholders solely for the purpose of raising the issue.
For example, the Project for Corporate Responsibility became the beneficial
holder of twelve shares of General Motors on January 29, 1970 in order to
have standing to launch Campaign GM Round I with its proposals for
the May 1970 Annual Meeting.3 Similarly, the Medical Committee for
Human Rights purchased five shares of Dow Chemical in order to raise the
napalm issue.84
31 Mr. Saul Alinsky looks to middle-class stockholders, rather than churches, founda-
tions and universities, as the primary base of support for his new organization for reform
of the corporation, Proxies for People. Interview with Saul Alinsky, Proxies for People:
A Vehicle for Involvement, I Yale Rev. Law & Social Action 64, 67 (Spring 1971).
32 Introduction to Social Criteria Resolutions, Feb. 18, 1971, submitted by Social
Criteria Committee to Executive Council of the Episcopal Church, approved by Executive
Council Feb. 18-21, 1971.
88 See General Motors Corp., Proxy Statement 16 (Apr. 6, 1970); Letter from Prof.
Donald E. Schwartz, Counsel to Campaign GM, to the SEC, Mar. 10, 1970, at n.l, reprinted
in 116 Cong. Rec. E2147-51 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1970).
84 Dow Chemical Company notes that the Medical Committee for Human Rights, which
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IV. CHANGES IN THE ORGANIC STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION
The demands of the corporate activists35 have not been confined to the
role of the corporation in society. They have also been directed toward
radical change in the organic structure of the corporation itself.8 6 Thus,
the original demand for a shareholders' committee for corporate respon-
sibility in Campaign GM Round 137 has been followed by similar proposals
to du Pont, 8s Honeywell8 9 and Phelps Dodge,40 and by shareholder proposals
calling for broadening the board to include representation of special in-
terest groups-employees, consumers, suppliers, dealers or the public gen-
erally-or otherwise changing board selection, to American Telephone and
Telegraph Co., 41 Gulf Oi42 and Honeywell 48 as well as in Campaign GM
Round 1. 4 This aspect of the corporate political struggle is rapidly be-
coming increasingly important.4 5
Earlier in the year, Mr. Ralph Nader called for what he termed the
"popularization" of the corporation. He suggested that in the large corpo-
ration, five of twenty directors should be elected directly by the public
at large in a national election, and the remaining fifteen should be elected
proposed a resolution pertaining to amendment of the Dow certificate of incorporation
to prohibit the making of napalm, bought five shares of Dow stock two years after Dow's
manufacture of napalm became a matter of common knowledge. Dow Chemical Co.,
Proxy Statement 10 (Mar. 16, 1971).
The Dow Chemical issue is perhaps the most celebrated confrontation of its kind.
It is of interest that the proposal of the Medical Committee for Human Rights with
respect to prohibiting the making of napalm received less than 3%/ of the votes cast at
the 1971 meeting. N.Y. Times, May 6, 1971, at 63, col. 2.
Another example of purchasing shares to acquire standing is the Domestic and Foreign
Missionary Society of the Protestant Episcopal Church, which purchased ten shares of
American Metal Climax, Inc. on Jan. 26, 1971 in order to present a proxy proposal and
to participate in the May 6, 1971 annual meeting. Proxy Statement of the Domestic and
Foreign Missionary Society of the Protestant Episcopal Church for the 1971 Annual
Meeting of American Metal Climax, Inc. 2 (Apr. 9, 1971).
85 The term "activist" has apparently become respectable. Thus, John D. Harper,
Chairman of the Aluminum Company of America, in addressing the annual meeting
stated: "Your management accepts for Alcoa the role of social and environmental activist
in the very best sense of that term-in the sense of effecting desirable change." Alcoa,
First Quarter Statement 4 (Apr. 29, 1971).
86 The Wall Street Journal notes that the objectives of the protesting groups have
shifted to a "more fundamental attack on the structure of the corporation itself."
Wall St. Journal, Mar. 26, 1971, at 4, col. 3.
37 General Motors Corp. Proxy Statement 16-19 (Apr. 6, 1970).
88 E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Proxy Statement 10-12 (Mar. 12, 1971).
89 Honeywell Inc., Proxy Statement 6-8 (Apr. 2, 1971).
40 Phelps Dodge Corp., Proxy Statement 13-15 (Mar. 25, 1971).
41 American Tel. & Tel. Co., Proxy Statement 12-13 (Mar. 3, 1971).
42 Gulf Oil Corp., Proxy Statement 8 (Mar. 25, 1971).
48 Honeywell, Inc., Proxy Statement 8 (Apr. 2, 1971).
44 Project on Corporate Responsibility, Campaign GM Round II Proxy Statement 8-11
(Nov. 19, 1970).
45 Mr. James Roche, Chairman of the Board of General Motors, has viewed such
proposals as attacks on the "free enterprise system." Wall St. Journal, Mar. 1971, at 4,
col. 3. A commentary in the New York Times, however, did not take these proposals
seriously, Bender, Universities' Corporate Voice, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1971, § 3, at 1,
col. 6, stating that the Campaign GM Round II "proposal [of this nature] . . . [was]
widely regarded as a throwaway." Id. at 14, col. 4.
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by shareholders under a proxy system that would permit the submission
of management and opposition slates in a single corporate solicitation at
corporate expense. He suggested accomplishment of this change through
the mechanism of a federal incorporation statute, which would supersede,
at least for large public corporations, the corporation laws of the various
states.40
V. CAMPAIGN GM ROUND I
Campaign GM Round I represents the decisive event in the politicaliza-
tion of the corporation.4 7 With proposals that it considered only "symbolic,"
and with an objective that was essentially political, it must be regarded as
a considerable success. It dramatized once and for all the potentialities
of what its counsel later described as the "public interest proxy contest." 48
Further, it shattered for all time the pattern of institutional neutrality
under which the institutional shareholder, particularly the non-profit in-
stitution, automatically voted its shares for management.4 9 As a result of
Campaign GM, American corporate electoral processes have become funda-
mentally changed.
The significance of Campaign GM is clearly not the actual result of the
balloting on the Campaign GM proposals at the 1970 Annual Meeting of
General Motors.50 The war was essentially won at a very early stage in the
contest when the Securities and Exchange Commission required inclusion
of the two Campaign GM proposals in the General Motors proxy state-
ment,51 and this action became front-page news in the New York Times.52
In addition, the continuing publicity that resulted as numerous prominent
institutions issued newsworthy, publicity-yielding explanations of their posi-
tion on these Campaign GM proposals58 consolidated the triumph.
The fruits of Campaign GM Round I can be summarized as follows:
(1) Prior to the Annual Meeting, General Motors felt obliged to respond
to the Campaign GM proposals with the distribution to its more than
1,300,000 shareholders of record and its many additional beneficial holders
of a 22-page pamphlet 54 describing General Motors "Record of Progress"
46 N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1971, § 3, at 1, col. 3.
47 A comprehensive review of Campaign GM Round I by its counsel appears in Schwartz,
supra note 9.
48 Id.
40 See Wall St. Journal, Apr. 28, 1971, at 1, col. 8; The Rowland Co., Inc., Survey of
Institutional Proxy Voting Attitudes (June, 1971).
50 Only 7.19% of General Motors shareholders holding 2.73% of the outstanding shares
voted in favor of the proposal to elect a shareholders' committee for corporate responsi-
bility, and only 6.22% of the shareholders holding 2.44% of the outstanding shares voted
in favor of the proposal to elect three "public" directors designated by Campaign GM.
General Motors Corp., Report of the 62nd General Motors Stockholders Meeting 7-10
(1970).
51 General Motors Corp., Proxy Statement 16-20 (Apr. 6, 1970).
52 N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
58 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 20, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
54 See note 16 supra.
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in automotive safety, air pollution control, mass transit, plant safety and
social welfare, as well as full-page advertisements in 150 newspapers further
defending its record on air pollution.55
(2) An appropriate interval after the Annual Meeting, General Motors
designated five of its public directors as a Public Policy Committee to advise
it on the environmental and social impact of its operations. 56
(3) In January 1971, the General Motors Board elected Dr. Leon H.
Sullivan as its first black director.57
(4) In February 1971, General Motors appointed a prominent authority
on air pollution, Professor Ernest S. Starkman of the University of Califor-
nia, as a vice-president in charge of environmental activities. 58
(5) Later in February 1971, General Motors announced that it had ob-
tained the services of a group of six distinguished American scientists headed
by Nobel laureate Charles H. Townes, and including former presidential
science advisor Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, to advise it on technological and
scientific matters, "including in particular the effects of General Motors'
operations and products upon the environment." 59
(6) In March 1971, General Motors appointed a black, Abraham S.
Venable, as director of urban affairs.60
(7) Later in March 1971, General Motors distributed to all shareholders
a 49-page brochure6l reporting in detail on a conference held "for a group
of prominent educators and representatives of foundations and investment
institutions . . . to explain the progress General Motors has made in a
number of areas of public concern .... -62 In concluding this meeting,
General Motors Vice-Chairman Richard C. Gerstenberg stated:
This whole meeting was concerned with the need we at General Motors
recognize to do better-to build even safer cars, to clean up the en-
vironment, to promote minority opportunity, to work for better mass
transportation, to do all that is expected of us.
We are determined to do all these things-not only to benefit our
customers, not only to benefit our stockholders-but to benefit the
whole of society .... It is a job we take most seriously.68
Perhaps some of these developments would have occurred in any case,
but one is permitted a certain degree of skepticism. In brief, the foregoing
represents a series of remarkable developments arising after the conduct of
55 See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 428.
50 Bus. Week, Jan. 9, 1971, at 17.
57 N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1971, at 49, col. 5. This action is a refreshing contrast to the
incident that the Wall Street Journal described as the "most dramatic episode" at the
1970 Annual Meeting. When a black woman law student inquired why General Motors
had no black directors, Chairman Roche's only explanation was: "Because none have
been elected." Wall St. Journal, May 25, 1970, at 4, col. 3.
58 Bus. Week, Feb. 6, 1971, at 80.
59 James M. Roche, GM chairman, quoted in the Wall St. Journal, Feb. 25, 1971, at 8,
col. 1; accord, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1971, at 28, col. 5.
60 Wall St. Journal, Mar. 18, 1971, at 9, col. 2.
61 General Motors Corp., Progress in Areas of Public Concern (Feb. 1971).
62 Id. at 1.
68 Id. at 48.
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Campaign GM Round I by a group of a few young people holding only
twelve shares of General Motors out of the more than 286,000,000 shares
outstanding. It also represents a vigorous and imaginative response by
General Motors to the political situation confronting it. Unquestionably,
these developments played a significant part in the lower percentage of
votes cast for the proposals in Campaign GM Round 11.64
The critical aspect of Campaign GM Round I which must be emphasized
is the nature of the appeal that was made. The appeal was to the share-
holder as a citizen, not as a shareholder. It was an appeal based on what
was alleged to be good for the country, not on what was good for General
Motors, as well as a frank recognition that what was good for the country
might not be good for General Motors, at least in the short run, and per-
haps not even in the long run. It contended that the shareholder's interest
as a citizen in the underlying social problems transcended his interest as
a shareholder in General Motors, and that he should vote as citizen, not
as shareholder.
Finally, Campaign GM represented the view that the decision on social
reform proposals should not be made solely by shareholders and that "the
[non-shareholder] public should be part of the decision-making process." 6 5
Such a view highlights the far-reaching impact of the public-interest proxy
movement.
VI. THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE MAJOR CORPORATIONS
The separation of ownership and control has come full circle in the giant
corporation. The dispersion and fragmentation of ownership has created a
self-perpetuating board of directors that is essentially not accountable to
the owners of the enterprise. It has also created a widespread enfranchised
constituency, 66 whose members typically have an economic stake with less
significance than their economic stake in the outcome of contests in the
traditional political arena,67 and whose reactions, in significant measure,
may reflect public and social considerations rather than the economic ob-
64 The vote on the Campaign GM Round II proposals were as follows:
(a) the proposal to permit nomination of directors by 100 shareholders or the
the holders of 1,500 shares and their inclusion in the corporate proxy solicitation
along with the management slate: yes-l.36%, no-98.64%.
(b) the proposal to permit nomination of one director each by constituencies
consisting of employees, dealers and consumers acting on the basis of one vote per
person, with election by a majority of the shareholders: yes-l.ll%, no- 98.89%.
(c) the proposal calling for additional disclosure in the annual report of data with
respect to minority employment, pollution and safety: yes-2.36%, no-97.64%.
General Motors Corp., Report of the 63rd General Motors Stockholders Meeting 7-9
(May 21, 1971).
These results compare with 2.44% and 2.73% of the shares in favor of the Campaign
GM Round I proposals. See note 50 supra.
65 Schwartz, supra note 9, at 485.
66 For example, General Motors' approximately 286 million shares are distributed among
more than 1.3 million shareholders of record and many more beneficial shareholders.
General Motors Corp., Annual Report 1970, 25, 34-35.
67 Of the General Motors' shareholders 42% own 25 shares or less and 797 own 100
shares or less. Id. at 25.
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jectives of the business. Further, the constituency represents a cross section
of the nation and, in addition, is so numerous that events relating to the
corporate electoral processes become major news items in the communica-
tions media.
The corporate electoral process is thus ripe for politicalization, at least
in the very large corporation. This should be no surprise. From many
points of view large corporations can be regarded as political or quasi-
governmental institutions. General Motors is the prime example.68 With
total revenues of $48.6 billion,69 with 793,924 employees economically de-
pendent on it with annual wages of almost $7 billion,70 and with an inter-
national production of 7.16 million cars and trucks in 1969,71 the decision
of General Motors with respect to capital investment, plant locations and
closings, employment, price and wage policies represents actions of vast
implications for the countries, communities and individuals involved. The
concentration in the major industrial companies of such formidable eco-
nomic power, affecting so many persons and communities, has been described
by observers as constituting private governments, 72 and it has been sug-
gested that constitutional concepts developed with respect to traditional
governmental processes might well be extended to the leviathans of in-
dustry.73
There is no need to go so far in this discussion. It need only be noted
that the politicalization of the corporation, especially where its policies
have become the subject of spirited controversies involving social or moral
considerations, rather than economic implications for the corporation, is
entirely in keeping with the view of the giant corporation as a private
government.
VII. THE ELECTORATE OF THE NEW CORPORATE POLITICS
The electorate of the new corporate politics provides a solid base of
potential support for the forces of social reform.
68 General Motors is the largest industrial corporation, Fortune, May 1971, at 172, and
there are not many companies whose operations are comparable. On the other hand, it is
the example par excellence of very large Amrican public corporations which, with respect
to far-reaching social and political implications of their decisions, differ among themselves
in degree, but not in kind.
69 General Motors had 1969 sales of $24.3 billion dollars. General Motors Corp.,
Annual Report 1969, 38-39, and revenues of $24.303 billion from its wholly owned, but
unconsolidated, finance subsidiary, General Motors Acceptance Corporation. Am. Banker,
May 28, 1970. Because of the distortions in operations caused by the ten-week strike in 1970,
1969 statistics pertaining to net sales, number of employees and annual wages have been
used.
70 General Motors Corp., Annual Report 1969, 38-39.
71 Id.
72 E. Latham, The Body Politic of the Corporation, in The Corporation in Modern
Society 218 (E. Mason ed. 1959); A. Miller, Private Governments and the Constitution,
in The Corporate Take-Over 126 (A. Hacker ed. 1964); see A. Berle, Economic Power in
the Free Society 12-15 (1957).
73 A. Berle, The Three Faces of Power 39-48 (1967); Miller, supra note 72; Latham, The
Commonwealth of the Corporation, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 25, 33-37 (1960). Mr. Ralph Nader
has also embraced this view. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1971, § 3, at 1, col. 6. But see Manne,
supra note 19, at 423-30.
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A. Institutional Investors
Institutional investors now hold an increasing proportion of the out-
standing equity securities of the major American corporations. As of the
end of 1970, the New York Stock Exchange estimated that $161.9 billion,
or 25.4 percent of all equity securities of companies listed on the exchange,
were held by institutions. 74 The Patman Committee75 estimated that in 1967
the trust departments of commercial banks held a total of $167 billion of
equity securities; this estimate, however, included all equity shares, not
merely those listed on the New York Stock Exchange.78
The tradition, until recently, has been strongly against active participa-
tion by institutional holders in the affairs of the companies whose shares
are held in the institutional portfolio. 7 Although there have been some
recent signs of a change in attitude on the part of some funds,78 generally
speaking, institutions are still either prepared to support mangement or
dispose of their holdings.
There are a number of factors that are critical in a review of the impact
of moral or social considerations upon the policies of institutional investors.
The first factor is the context in which the investment decision is made.
This depends on the precise question for decision by the institutional in-
vestor. Whether it is a question of the policy for new investments, the sale
of existing investments, or the voting of shares on social reform proposals
contained in a proxy solicitation or some other participation in the corpora-
tion decision-making process, may alter the quality of the decision.
74 The following is the Exchange breakdown of institutional holdings:
Pension Funds (public and private) 59.7 billion or 9.3%
Investment Companies 43.8 billion or 6.8%
Non-Profit Institutions (universities and foundations) 30.2 billion or 4.7%
Insurance Companies 23.1 billion or 3.6%
Common Trust Funds 4.2 billion or 0.6%
With unregistered mutual funds, investment partnerships, non-bank trusts and foreign
institutions included, the Exchange estimated that the total of all institutional holdings
would exceed 40%. Wall St. Journal, Mar. 1, 1971, at 3, col. 4.
75 The House Committee on Banking and Currency.
76 See Time, June 1, 1970, at 55.
77 D. Baum & N. Stiles, The Silent Partners 63 (1965); A. Berle, Power Without Property
55 (1959).
78 See Barber, The American Corporation 53-69 (1970); Why the Big Traders Worry
Industry, Bus. Week, July 25, 1970, at 53-61.
Mr. Galston sees this change in attitude and resulting responsibility as dual: to their
own beneficiaries and to their fellow stockholders in the corporation, particularly the
many small public holders who have no effective voice. Accordingly, he argues that the
institutional investor
must, it would seem, shed the cloak of the passive equity owner and become . . .
alert and active as to voting the stock intelligently at stockholders' meetings, alert
and active on . . . issues involving large scale participation of corporate efforts and
funds in community affairs.
He continues
In this way, the institutional investor is carrying out its fiduciary responsibilities to
its beneficiaries and also playing the role of the responsible stockholder among all
other public stockholders of the corporation. Why isn't this a healthy program for
commerce and industry?
C. Galston, Fiduciary Responsibility of Institutional Investors, a paper presented to The
Association of Life Insurance Counsel, Dec. 10, 1968, at 23-24.
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Another factor is whether a specific social proposal will involve any ap-
preciable economic loss to the corporation and its shareholders. In the ab-
sence of economic loss for the corporation, and therefore of any adverse
economic impact on the fiduciary's investment in the corporation, the prob-
lem facing the institutional fiduciary is significantly changed; the fiduciary's
concern with its obligation to maximize return is no longer relevant. The
absence of any direct corporate loss in a proposal increases the possibility
of institutional support. 79
The size of the institutional holding may also be of importance. Mr.
David Rockefeller, a decade ago, suggested that as the size of funds of
institutional holdings in particular companies increases, the problems of
liquidation of a substantial holding may be so severe as to deter manage-
ment from selling and thereby force it to be more demanding of corporate
management.8 0 In noting this development, Mr. Clarence Galston properly
observes that if "the institution is locked into an investment, it would seem
expedient, and perhaps mandatory, that it exercise judgment on significant
corporate issues." 8'
Finally the type of institutional investor is of significance. Is the institu-
tion organized for profit or is it a non-profit organization? If non-profit,
what are the objectives of the institution?
79 Many of the social reform proposals included in the corporate proxy statements of
companies such as General Motors, General Motors Corp., Proxy Statement 16-19 (Apr. 6,
1970), Gulf, Gulf Oil Corp., Proxy Statement 6-11 (Mar. 25, 1971), duPont, E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., Proxy Statement 10-11 (Mar. 12, 1971), American Telephone and Tele-
graph, American Tel. & Tel. Co., Proxy Statement 12-13 (Mar. 3, 1971), and Honeywell, Inc.,
see supra note 39, would have involved no material cost to the corporation. For the most
part they related to the organic structure of the corporation, proposing changes in the
composition of the Board of Directors to include representatives of such groups as em-
ployees, dealers, consumers, minorities, the public and even investment bankers, or persons
"with expertise in the areas of consumer protection, ecology, and the principles of eco-
nomic conversion." Honeywell, Inc., Proxy Statement 8 (Apr. 2, 1971). Other proposals
involved establishment of shareholders' committees for corporate responsibility, limitation
on interlocking directorates, disclosure and review of operations. Similarly, the three Cam-
paign GM Round II proposals would have involved no economic loss. Two related to
the organic structure of the corporation involving the election of directors and the third
pertained to increased disclosure. See note 64 supra.
Some of the social reform proposals in the 1971 proxy statements would, however,
produce significant loss to the corporation. These include the Presbyterian Chuch resolu-
tions to amend the certificate of incorporation of Gulf to exclude investment in colonial
areas and the Episcopal Church's resolution to amend the certificate of incorporation of
General Motors to end manufacturing in South Africa, and its American Metal Climax
and Kennecott Copper resolutions that the companies not enter into new mining ventures
unless they pay compensation for environmental damage. Proxy Statement of the Domes-
tic and Foreign Missionary Society of the Protestant Episcopal Church for the 1971 Annual
Meeting of American Metal Climax, Inc. 4 (Apr. 9, 1971); Proxy Statement of the Domestic
and Foreign Missionary Society of the Protestant Episcopal Church for the 1971 Annual
Meeting of Kennecott Copper Corp. 4 (Apr. 9, 1971).
80 See D. Baum & N. Stiles, The Silent Partners 80 (1965); Galston, supra note 78, at 21.
This view is also shared by Malkiel and Quandt, Malkiel & Quandt, Moral Issues in
Investment Policy, Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar.-Apr. 1971, at 37, 38, and Landau, Landau, Do
Institutional Investors Have a Social Responsibility?, Institutional Investor, July 1970,
at 26-27.
81 See Galston, supra note 78, at 21-22.
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1. The Non-Profit Institutional Investor
Large non-profit institutional holders provide a major base of support
for social reform proposals. With continuing inflation, traditional concepts
of trust investments have changed, and churches, universities and founda-
tions have invested substantial portions of their portfolios in common
stocks. Churches, universities and foundations, with leadership and con-
stituencies possessing objectives and values quite different from those of
business, are particularly sensitive to proposals for social reform. It is safe
to predict that now, and in the future, they will find it even more difficult
not to play a leading role in the campaign for transformation of the objec-
tives of the large public corporation.
(a) Churches and Foundations. Achievement of social progress, rather
than maximization of economic return on investments, may readily be re-
garded as a fulfillment of the objectives of churches and foundations. This
is particularly true of those church denominations that have adopted
aggressive social action as a major institutional objective. A possible loss
of income or decrease in market value of a limited portion of its portfolio
may be regarded as an insignificant price to pay for immediate association
with a social movement of considerable appeal to both the leadership and
the membership of the church.
Until recently, church interest in corporate activities, at least on the
public level, was restricted to isolated incidents. Several years ago, for
example, the Methodist Board of Missions transferred management of its
$10 million investment portfolio from the First National City Bank because
of the Bank's continued participation in a banking consortium providing
financing to the Government of South Africa.8 2 Similarly, other church
groups, including the United Church of Christ, United Presbyterian Church
and the Episcopal Church, were ready to bring economic pressure on the
banks participating in the consortium.8 3 In addition, the women's division
of the Methodist Board of Missions sold its Dow Chemical shares, having a
value of $400,000, in protest over the napalm issue.8 4 Church groups also
supported FIGHT in its struggle with Eastman Kodak over black employ-
ment.
8 5
Even as recently as last year, church activity was limited. The sponsors
of Campaign GM Round I could identify only a few church groups, holding
an aggregate of 11,000 shares, among their supporters.86 This is a surpris-
ingly poor showing, although some unidentified church groups may also
have supported the Campaign.
82 N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1968, at 24, col. 1.
83 United Church of Christ, The Report of The Committee on Financial Investments,
Investing Church Funds for Maximum Social Impact 14 (Oct. 26, 1970) [hfereinafter cited
as United Church of Christ Report].
* 84 Time, Feb. 15, 1971, at 57.
85 A detailed review of the church role in the struggle between FIGHT and Eastman
Kodak Company appears in S. Strethi, supra note 5, at 324-39. See also Alinsky, supra
note 31, at 64, 67; Dietsch, Whose Business Is Business?, New Republic, Apr. 25, 1970, at 13.
88 Project on Corporate Responsibility, Campaign GM Scorecard 1.
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Since then, a major increase in church activity to influence corporate
policy has taken place. In fact, churches have now pushed to the forefront
of the corporate activists:8 7
(1) Four resolutions presented by the Southern Africa Task Force of the
United Presbyterian Church appeared in the Gulf Oil proxy statement for
consideration at the April 27, 1971 annual meeting. These called for
establishment of a committee to review Gulf's operations in Africa, amend-
ment of Gulf's charter to exclude investment in colonial areas, disclosure
of corporate charitable contributions and the increase of the Gulf Board
to include consumer, dealer and public representatives.88
(2) While the United Presbyterian Church as shareholder worked within
the Gulf corporate machinery, two agencies of the United Church of
Christ-the Council of Christian Social Action and the Ohio Conference-
urged a consumer boycott of Gulf because of its operations in Angola.
These church agencies "excoriated" Gulf's activities as supporting Portu-
guese colonialism in Africa and providing support for the suppression of
African national liberation movements. In response, Gulf is reported to have
threatened to sue the Ohio Conference for defamation.89
(3) Six major Protestant denominations, holding 60,000 shares of Ameri-
can Metal Climax, Inc. and 143,000 shares of Kennecott Copper Corpora-
tion, asked the two companies to postpone a proposed copper mining
venture in Puerto Rico until safeguards had been established to protect
the economic, social and ecological future of the island.90 The church groups,
although holding shares with a market value then in excess of $7,000,000
in the two mining companies, are not seeking to determine what is bene-
ficial to the companies, to themselves or to their fellow shareholders, either
in the short run, or in the long run. They are looking at the problem in
terms of what is desirable for the people of Puerto Rico; they are speaking
as members of the larger society. In this connection, it is worth noting that
approval of the project by the Puerto Rican government is not regarded
87 See National Council of Churches, Corporate Responsibility and Religious Institu-
tions (Apr. 1971); Executive Council of the Episcopal Church, Social Responsibility with
Church Investments (Apr. 1971); Editorial, Investment: The Church's Secret Weapon,
Social Action, Jan. 1971, at 3.
88 Gulf Oil Corp., Proxy Statement 6-11 (Mar. 25, 1971). See Bus. Week, Feb. 13, 1971,
at 86, 87; Bus. Week, Feb. 27, 1971, at 39. These proposals received approximately 1%
of the votes cast. N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1971, at 63, col. 6.
89 N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1970, at 11, col. 1; United Church Herald, Dec. 1970, at 47.
It would be interesting to know whether Gulf-shareholder United Presbyterian Church
supports the boycott of Gulf by the United Church of Christ agencies.90 Boston Globe, Feb. 13, 1971, at 16, col. 7; N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1971, at 31, col. 1;
see N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1971; Time, Feb. 15, 1971, at 57.
The Episcopal Bishop of Puerto Rico, holding one share of stock, submitted a resolution
to the same effect for consideration at the annual meetings of the two companies. Letter
of Episcopal Bishop of Puerto Rico, Francisco Reus-Froylan, to Frank R. Milliken,
President of Kennecott Copper Corp., Feb. 4, 1971; American Metal Climax, Inc., Report
of the Annual Meeting of Shareholders 14-15 (May 6, 1971). The resolution, however, was
not included in either corporate proxy statement.
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by the church groups as providing sufficient representation or protection
of Puerto Rican interests.9 ' Furthermore, the Presiding Bishop of the Epis-
copal Church submitted two additional resolutions for the annual meetings
of the two companies, relating to payment of compensation for environ-
mental damage generally and to disclosure of the steps taken to guard
against such damage. 92 Both resolutions were included in the American
Metal Climax, Inc. proxy statement,98 and the latter resolution was in-
cluded in the Kennecott Copper proxy statement. 94
(4) The Episcopal Church, holding 12,574 shares of General Motors
stock, offered a resolution for consideration at the General Motors Annual
Meeting on May 21, 1971, calling for amendment of the certificate of incor-
poration to require the company to cease manufacturing in South Africa.95
Numerous other church groups have attacked American business operations
in South Africa because of the country's racial policies, although at least
one distinguished liberal churchman has contended that the operations of
American business in South Africa are probably working for the long-term
benefit of the black population.9 6
The activity of the churches is not simply related to their appraisal of
their own responsibilities in voting shares already held. For example, the
Southern Africa Task Force of the United Presbyterian Church has gone
further and urged the church's boards, agencies and institutions to go out
and purchase additional Gulf shares to provide additional support for the
Church proposals. Two other agencies of the United Presbyterian Church-
the Council on Church and Race and the Council on Church and Society-
concurred in this recommendation.97 In addition, the church retained the
Project for Corporate Responsibility, which was responsible for Campaign
GM, to run a "major proxy solicitation and educational effort."9 8 With all
91 See Wall St. Journal, May 4, 1971, at 14, col. 3.
92 See Letter of Episcopal Bishop John E. Hines to Frank R. Milliken, President of
Kennecott Copper Corp., Feb. 3, 1971.
93 American Metal Climax, Inc., Proxy Statement 15-16 (Apr. 6, 1971). The payment
proposal received 2.9% of the votes cast and the disclosure proposal received 4.4% of the
votes. American Metal Climax, Inc., Report of the Annual Meeting of Shareholders 1-2
(May 6, 1971).
94 Kennecott Copper Corp., Proxy Statement 15-16 (Apr. 6, 1971). The proposal re-
ceived 1.6% of the votes cast. Wall St. Journal, May 5, 1971, at 34, col. 2.
95 Boston Globe, Feb. 6, 1971, at 20, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1971, at 1, col. 7;
Time, Feb. 15, 1971, at 57; Wall St, Journal, Feb. 22, 1971, at 6, col. 4. General Motors
Corp., Proxy Statement 39-41 (Apr. 5, 1971). The proposal received only 1.29% of the votes
cast. General Motors Corp., Report of the 63rd General Motors Shareholders Meeting 9-11
(1971).
96 See Rev. J. Martin Bailey, South African Dilemma, United Church Herald, Jan.
1971, at 45; novelist Alan Paton expressed this view at the 1971 Harvard Commencement.
Harvard Today, June, 1971, at 4. The Synod of the United Church of Christ reached a
similar conclusion. United Church Herald, Aug. 1971, at 5. See also Haynes, Bid to End
G.M. Role in South Africa Would Hurt Nonwhites, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1971, § 3, at 14,
col. 4. For replies to Haynes see N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1971, § 3, at 12, col. 3.
97 United Church Herald, Feb. 1971, at 10-11.
98 Bus. Week, Feb. 27, 1971, at 39.
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
this, the results obtained at the shareholders' meeting were surprisingly
poor.9 9
Thus, at the 1971 annual meetings various church groups proposed reso-
lutions relating to social or political questions for consideration at the
annual meetings of four major corporations: American Metal Climax, Gen-
eral Motors, Gulf Oil and Kennecott Copper. This is unprecedented in Amer-
ican corporate history. It seems only realistic to expect that utilization of the
corporate electoral machinery to advance the social concerns of church
groups will increase in the future and add further impetus to the intro-
duction of political and social considerations into corporate decisions.
In addition to their great prestige, church groups control substantial
funds and can exert considerable economic influence. 00 Thus some church
groups are "evaluating [their] portfolios in terms of such matters as racial
and economic justice, peace and world development"'01 or have accepted
"the 'responsibility... to utilize in a strategic way its economic power'" to
achieve social action.102 The Executive Council of the United Church of
Christ, for example, has adopted a recommendation to invest "a substantial
portion, not less than ten percent" of its unrestricted funds in "high-risk
and low-return" investments that will achieve "maximum social impact."' 03
Such financial power and the moral influence of the church groups clearly
represent major factors influencing the climate of opinion in which corpo-
rate management must operate.
The activities of foundations in this area have not been as prominent.
The Campaign GM Round I Scorecard shows only two foundations, holding
a total of 7,830 General Motors shares, in favor of the Campaign GM pro-
posals.104 There is no reason to suppose, however, that the concern of
foundations with the interrelation of their investment policies with
philanthropic activities, with the voting of their shares, and with social
reform proposals will not increase, along with the increasing concern of
churches and universities.105
09 The proposals received less than 2% of the votes cast. Bus. Week, May 1, 1971,
at 21; N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1971, at 63, col. 6.
100 A church task force has estimated that perhaps 4 billion dollars of current invest-
ments might be changed to reflect the "stated social and public policy" views of the
churches. N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1971, at 1, col. 7.
101 Boston Globe, Feb. 13, 1971, at 16, col. 7. See Boston Globe, Feb. 6, 1970, at 20, col. 1.
102 United Church of Christ Report at 11. See also Bus. Week, Feb. 13, 1971, at 29;
United Church Herald, Jan. 1971, at 8.
103 United Church of Christ Report at 51.
At the same time, the church group expressed the opinion that personal influence on
corporate management as a result of conference and discussion was more useful than
participation in stockholder meetings. Id. at 43.
104 Project for Corporate Responsibility, Campaign GM Scorecard 4. The Rockefeller
and Carnegie Foundations voted with management, but with reservations. Id. It is also
known that a number of foundations are providing financial support for so-called public
interest groups active in promoting the recognition of social and moral factors in the
conduct of corporate affairs. Bus. & Soc'y, Jan. 7, 1971, at 4; Bus. Week, May 30, 1970,
at 84; id., Apr. 17, 1971, at 42; Time, May 3, 1971, at 84.
105 Thus, the Ford Foundation announced in February that it is conducting a com-
prehensive review of its policies and responsibilities in this area. Bus. Week, Feb. 13,
1971, at 29.
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(b) Universities. Educational institutions are another powerful source
of potential support for political and social demands on corporations. The
constituents of these institutions, particularly students, 106 are articulate,
alert to public issues and ready to identify with the objectives of social
reform. In Campaign GM Round I, for example, they responded in large
numbers to the appeal of the movement.
Within the universities, the supporters of social protest typically lack any
real participation in the decision-making process. This creates at least two
forces that are brought to bear to influence institutional decisions. First,
those interested in reallocation of power within the university have found
campaigns to force the university trustees to vote against management on
issues of social reform a useful device. Their target is the university struc-
ture, with social issues serving as rallying points, rather than as major ends
in themselves. Second, neither the students, the faculty at large nor alumni
have any immediate responsibility for the financial conduct of the university,
and consequently are insensitive to the significance of the possible economic
impact of the decision on the institution or of the pressure to squeeze the
maximum return out of endowments. 107 The issue is presented as a politi-
cal question affecting the American society generally and is so received and
evaluated by the constituents of the university, who respond to the political
appeal on the political level.
This was reflected in Campaign GM Round I. The details of its pro-
posals, their relation to the fulfillment of the objectives of General Motors,
their impact on General Motors and on its shareholders, and their relation-
ship to the financial posture of the university received little consideration in
the discussions of students and faculty. They were essentially irrelevant in
terms of the political considerations that were involved. As previously
noted,108 the objective of the campaign was "symbolic."
In significant part as a response to student pressure, twelve colleges and
universities, including Amherst, Antioch, Boston University, Brown, Lin-
coln, Iowa State, Oregon and Tufts, holding approximately 65,000 shares,
voted in favor of one or both Campaign GM proposals,109 and five others,
Rockefeller, Stanford, Swarthmore, Williams and Yale, holding approxi-
mately 196,000 shares, abstained.110 Further, other distinguished universities,
including Harvard, Dartmouth and Pennsylvania, although voting with
management in opposition to the proposals, made clear their concern with
the limited nature of General Motors' response to the social crisis, and
106 It has been pointed out that for students "the University is the most accessible
and vulnerable institution subject to pressure in support of social needs .... " Harvard
Committee on Governance, Harvard and Money-A Memorandum on Issues and Choices
24 (1970).
107 As will be seen, see p. 446 infra, the report of the Harvard Committee reviewing the
problem emphasized the importance to the university of maximizing return.
108 See p. 435 supra.
109 Project for Corporate Responsibility, Campaign GM Scorecard 1.
110 Id. at 3.
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
served warning that their support of management should not be assumed
in the future."'
In view of the intensity of student and faculty pressure, the universities'
problems in this area are of serious proportions. This is well recognized
by university administrators at Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Pennsylvania and
elsewhere. During the period 1969-1970, at the request of the President and
members of the Finance Committee of the Yale Corporation, and with the
financial support of the Ford Foundation, a seminar on "Yale's Invest-
ments" reviewed in detail the relation of social responsibility and university
investments.11 2 In October 1970, the presidents and other senior repre-
sentatives of many prominent colleges and universities met under the
auspices of the Taconic Foundation to consider the draft Yale report, to re-
view the general problems presented by the demand for social or political
utilization of the university portfolio and to develop a better understanding
of possible solutions.
At Harvard, President Pusey appointed a committee of distinguished
scholars, headed by Professor Robert W. Austin, and including Professors
Louis Loss and A. James Casner, among others, to advise the university in
this area. The report of the Harvard Committee 1 3 essentially called for
initial investment to achieve maximum economic return, excluding only
investments presenting moral problems. 114 As examples of investments that
might best be avoided, the report listed tobacco stocks, 1 5 South African
corporations 116 and corporations practicing racial and other discrimina-
tion.117 Where the university was already an investor the Committee con-
cluded that it should not sell its stock, but at the same time it could not
remain passive, since abstention in most cases was a vote for management. 118
The Committee advised that the university-like any other institutional
investor:
may properly, and sometimes should, attempt to influence manage-
ment in directions that are considered to be socially desirable....
Certainly the University should vote its stock on occasion in favor
of change for the symbolic effect of a great university's taking a
position on a social problem.119
Il1 For a better glimpse of the impact of public opinion, it is worth noting that al-
though the Harvard Corporation voted its 287,000 shares in favor of management with
an admonition about the future, the Harvard student body and the Harvard Faculty of
Arts and Sciences strongly approved, and in a poll conducted by the Harvard Alumni
Bulletin, the Harvard alumni by a vote of 4-3 supported the Campaign GM proposals.
Project for Corporate Responsibility, Campaign GM Scorecard 3.
112 The report of this inquiry has not yet been publicly released.
118 Report of the Committee on University Relations with Corporate Enterprise (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Harvard Report].
114 Id. at 2-3.
115 Id. at 2.
116 Id. The report, however, reaches no condusion on American corporations doing
business in South Africa. Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 3.
119 Id. at 2-3. Professors Malkiel and Quandt of Princeton agree that the university
must invest for maximum return, should participate, subject to moral limitations, in
THE POLITICALIZATION OF THE CORPORATION
In addition, the Committee called for appointment of a non-financial ad-
visor to review social implications of the university's investment policies.' 20
The net effect of the Harvard Committee report is a recognition of the
responsibility of the university to review social reform proposals on their
merits, and to respond to social values in its dealing with management,
without, however, providing any standards to guide the university or its
advisor on these matters, other than to observe that the drawing of a policy
line is difficult, as indeed it is.
Church groups, investing funds with the income allocated for church
purposes, and foundations may have little difficulty in deciding whether to
invest funds to achieve "maximum social impact." Investment may well be
regarded as a method of achieving church or foundation objectives, which
in turn would justify the possible economic costs involved, at least from the
point of view of the institution. No such easy resolution of the problem is
possible in the case of universities, where educational objectives may not be
defined in such terms as will justify the diversion of resources to achieve
social programs, at least programs in localities outside of the immediate
community in which the university is located.
Where the issue does not involve a proposal to invest institutional funds
to achieve social progress, a different issue is presented. Where the proposal
is the prohibition of corporate activities that may properly be regarded as
involving moral, not merely political, considerations, the institution may
not avoid evaluation of the issue on its merits. A decision not to support
such a proposal is a moral decision. Fiduciaries, along with common mortals,
must observe a moral responsibility for their acts.
This merely postpones the debate one step. What is moral? Does the
manufacture of products in South Africa present a moral question? Does
the sale, as distinct from the manufacture, of products also present a moral
question? What of the manufacture or sale of products in other countries
such as Greece, or those of the Communist world? What of the manufacture
of anti-personnel weapons or other military equipment for the Department
of Defense? Do these present moral questions? There will be areas of agree-
ment, but in many cases, opinions will differ. What then does the university
do?
Further, assuming that the investment survives moral scrutiny, what de-
cision does the university make on proposals relating to matters that are, in
the language of the Austin Committee at Harvard, "considered to be socially
corporate affairs rather than sell its shares, and cannot avoid social and moral values in
the voting of its shares and in other participation in corporate affairs. Malkiel & Quandt,
supra note 80.
120 Harvard Report at 4. The Committee on Financial Investments of the United
Church of Christ had earlier reached the same conclusion. United Church of Christ Re-
port at 47. The desirability of some agency to advise on social responsibility for investors,
who do not have the time or facility to do so, has also been suggested in the financial
community itself. C. Galston, Institutional Investors-Their Role as Stockholders of
Portfolio Companies Confronting Environmental and Social Problems, a paper presented
to Annual Meeting of Association of American Law Schools, Dec. 28, 1970, at 25; Landau,
supra note 80, at 25.
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desirable,"121 or on proposals pertaining to the organic structure of the
corporation? The issue of whether employee, consumer, supplier or dealer
members should be added to the boards of directors of General Motors or
Gulf Oil or American Telephone is clearly a political, not a moral, issue.
What standards should apply? Through what process and by whom should
the decision be made? What sort of administrative apparatus will be re-
quired to collect relevant information,122 to ascertain the views of the
educational community and to emerge with a recommendation? What
distraction will this create from the basic function of the university? What
impact will the proposal have on the economic prospects of the investment?
What impact will the university action have on the public?
There are a number of areas of serious concern. First, the university may
not be able to function as an educational institution if the educational
climate becomes inflamed from being embroiled in continuing debate on
issues extraneous to its primary purpose. Second, the symbolic effect of
university action with respect to social reform proposals will involve it in
public controversy, which conceivably could, in the long run, lead to re-
taliatory action, including reexamination of its tax-exempt status.123 Finally,
the problem must be set against the background of the overwhelming
financial needs of American private universities, where any policy which
interferes with maximum return on investments aggravates an already
difficult financial posture.
In reviewing the different contexts in which this problem may arise, it
is apparent that the major area calling for an institutional response occurs
when an issue has been thrust upon the institution because it has been
placed on a corporate proxy statement. The university cannot escape a
decision. It may vote in favor, or oppose, or abstain, or sell its shares, but
a decision of some sort is inevitable. This is in marked contrast to other
areas where the university may choose to ignore proposals for greater social
involvement. The response to the proxy proposal is entirely different from
the suggestion that the university utilize a portion of its endowment to make
new investments to achieve social purposes or to encourage socially re-
sponsible management. It is also entirely different from the question of
when, if ever, may the university itself initiate, either alone or with others,
proposals for social reform pertaining to the corporations in which it owns
shares.
These are interesting and troubling questions. The university can no
longer escape its responsibility in facing up to them. The Austin Committee
at Harvard has recognized this responsibility and in effect, has said that
the university must weigh each social reform proposal on the merits in de-
termining its action.124 The patterns of the past have been shattered. The
121 Harvard Report at 3.
122 See id. at 3-4.
123 See Harvard Committee on Governance, Harvard and Money-A Memorandum on
Issues and Choices 34-35 (1970). See Malkiel & Quandt, supra note 80, at 44.
124 See Harvard Report at 2-3.
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institution can no longer automatically vote its shares for management.
This is a decisive contrast to the attitudes of yesteryear. It is a remarkable
demonstration of the success of efforts, such as Campaign GM, to change the
basic pattern of institutional response. It is a confirmation that politicali-
zation of the corporation has occurred in significant measure and is with
us to stay.
(c) Retirement Funds. The foregoing discussion has involved the rela-
tion between social proposals and the non-profit institution with respect to
the investment of the institution's unrestricted funds. In many cases, how-
ever, the non-profit institution holds additional funds--of which retirement
funds are a prime example-for the benefit of participants.
In cases where the obligation is to pay a pension in a fixed amount ir-
respective of the yield of the retirement fund portfolio, the problem in
effect becomes merged with the overall financial problems of the institution;
provision for pensions is merely one of the items of total expense to be
funded by total revenues. In other cases, however, the amount of the
pension is measured by the performance of the retirement fund portfolio,
with the institution under no obligation to fund any deficiency; in such
event, the economic costs of a social proposal, if there be any, are borne by
the participants, not by the institution. Whether or not the objectives of the
institution will be furthered by a social proposal involving significant cost
to the corporation, it will be accomplished at the expense of those interested
in the fund.
In the cases where social action involves loss to the corporation, some
institutions, such as churches, may be prepared to accept a reduced return
on their investment in order to achieve social objectives deemed important
to the institution. Is it prepared to take the same action with pension funds
if it means a reduction in pensions to participants? Is it prepared to decide
the question itself or would it prefer to refer the question to the participants
on some sort of "pass-through" voting? Is it prepared to permit a majority
of participants to approve an action x2 5 which conceivably could mean the
reduction in pensions of all concerned, including an opposing minority?
The Pension Boards of the United Church of Christ are considering an
interesting solution to this dilemma. They are exploring a proposal that
their retirement funds be divided into two separate funds.126 One fund "in
accordance with the practices heretofore followed" would seek "to provide
the best return over the long run consistent with the preservation of princi-
pal."127 The other would consist of "investments which might be made to
maximize social impact" involving "lower yields or greater risk."s28 A
125 Professors Malkiel and Quandt would permit a majority of the individuals, for
whose benefit the fund is operated, to make the decision. Malkiel & Quandt, supra note
80, at 45.
128 United Church of Christ Report at 34 n.10; Powers, Reflections on a Crossing,
Social Action, Jan. 1971, at 14, 22-23.
127 United Church of Christ Report at 34 n.10.
128 Id.
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participant, with the consent of his employer, would be allowed to allo-
cate "some portion of current contributions" 129 for his account to the
second fund. The report of the Church discussing this matter states that
"[n]o single area of discussion in the Committee deliberations produced
wider differences of opinion."13 0 This comment, as well as the highly re-
stricted nature of the proposal under exploration, confirms that at least
this church agency is not prepared to achieve social gain by imposing an
involuntary sacrifice upon participants. There is some basis for concluding
that man tends to act more like "economic man," and less like "social man, "
when his own financial interests are affected by the action in question. A
recent study has indicated that pension fund participants may indeed be
hostile to investment policies of pension funds that would reduce pensions,
notwithstanding the social values that might be achieved. 131
The same type of problem arises in the case of fiduciaries managing
pension funds unassociated with any particular institution, such as the Col-
lege Retirement Equities Fund, which had over 1.5 billion dollars of equity
securities in its portfolio as of December 31, 1970.182 It is worthy of note that
the decision of the trustees of the College Retirement Equities Fund to vote
its 608,000 shares of General Motors in favor of management and against
the two Campaign GM Round I proposals was made by the narrow vote
of 9 to 7.183 Neither of such proposals, it should be emphasized, involved
any immediate economic loss to General Motors. One may inquire whether
the CREF trustees, who voted for the Campaign GM Round I proxy pro-
posals, would have felt free to support those Campaign GM Round I
proposals omitted from the corporate proxy statement which would have
involved significant economic loss to General Motors.
In Campaign GM Round II, the CREF trustees, then holding 715,000
General Motors shares, voted 8-7 to support the proposal for disclosure,
divided 7-7, with one abstention, and abstained on the proposal to permit
shareholders to nominate an opposition slate of directors, and voted 15-0
against the special interest representation proposal.184
None of the Campaign GM Round II proposals involved direct economic
loss to the corporation. The Episcopal Church proposal to cease manu-
facturing in South Africa, however, presented the possibility of substantial
cost. On the proposal the CREF trustees voted 10-4, with one abstention, to
vote against the proposal.18 5
129 Id.
180 Id.
131 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1971, at 52, col. 3. Dr. Charles Powers of the Yale Divinity
School has sadly noted that "[t]he clergy . . . have shown no great interest in having
these [pension] funds included in the social-investment initiatives." Powers, supra note
126, at 22.
182 Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund,
Investment Supplement to the 1970 Annual Report 42.
188 Project on Corporate Responsibility, Campaign GM Scorecard 4.
184 Wall St. Journal, May 3. 1971, at 7, col. 4.
185 NY. Times, May 1, 1971, at 68, col. 1.
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There are significant differences between the retirement plans of non-
profit institutions and the pension or profit-sharing plans of business cor-
porations. The trustee, institutional or otherwise, has been handpicked by
the board of directors of the company in question, which customarily
retains the power to remove the trustee and designate its successor. The
views of the trustee are thus apt to reflect in some degree the values of
the board of directors of the employer. Contrast this posture with the
four trustees of CREF who were elected by the faculty participants in the
plan'8 6 and therefore reflected faculty attitudes on a representative basis.
Further, in the case of industrial pension funds, the results of the opera-
tion of the trust portfolios will increase or decrease the current and future
contributions by employers. The benefit of performance inures to the
employer, and the pressure will clearly be for economic rather than social
performance. Similarly, where the industrial fund is a profit-sharing fund,
the amount of the ultimate distributions to beneficiaries will reflect the
economic performance of the fund, and the trustees will be under pressure
to maximize return.
The question of "pass-through" voting by beneficiaries deserves at least
brief mention. Messrs. Lewis and John Gilbert list no less than forty-one
well-known corporations that are using "pass-through" voting procedures in
which company shares held under pension, profit-sharing, stock-purchase,
thrift and similar plans are voted by the trustees pursuant to instructions
from the beneficial owners.'3 7 These examples pertain only to the voting of
the shares of the company establishing the plan, and not to the entire port-
folio. The "pass-through" practice is obviously designed to eliminate the
conflict of interest inherent in direct or indirect management influence on
the voting of the shares held under such plans with respect to their own
election as directors or other management proposals.
This widespread development illustrates the feasibility of the "pass-
through" voting system. Its use in the cases mentioned above, however,
rests essentially on the disqualification of the trustees because of the con-
flicts of interest involved. The question remains whether, in cases where
the trustees are not so disqualified, they may abdicate their responsibilities
and properly permit decisions in the social reform area to be made by the
beneficiaries.
138 Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association--College Retirement Equities Fund,
Investment Supplement to the 1970 Annual Report, Inside Front Cover.
137 L. Gilbert & J. Gilbert, Thirty-First Annual Report of Stockholders Activities at
Corporation Meetings 251-55 (1970). Sears, Roebuck and Co., with 21% of its shares held
by The Savings and Profit Sharing Pension Fund, is an outstanding example. See Letter
from Austin T. Cushman, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, to the B, C and D
members of The Savings and Profit Sharing Pension Fund of Sears, Roebuck and Co.
Employees, Apr. 23, 1971. It may be noted that Federated Department Stores, Inc. did
not permit "pass-through" voting for the 3,137,249 shares held by its Retirement Income
and Thrift Incentive Plan although these amounted to approximately 7% of the shares
outstanding. Federated Department Stores, Inc., Report of the Annual Meeting of Share-
holders 1-2 (June 1, 1971).
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2. Mutual Funds and Insurance Companies
Other institutional investors, such as mutual funds and stock insurance
companies are organized with economic, rather than non-profit, objectives.
The question arises: to what extent are such organizations apt to respond
affirmatively to proposals related to social progress rather than the advance-
ment, at least in the short run, of corporate objectives or shareholder in-
terests? It is clear that they will not escape some involvement in the growing
concern over the social and environmental impact of business operations.
Thus, a prominent legal educator recently submitted a proposal to the
Fidelity Trend Fund for consideration at its 1971 annual meeting, that the
fund adopt, as its investment policy, a procedure for evaluation of the
performance of companies in the areas of "pollution control, minority
hiring practices, and production and marketing in South Africa, Rhodesia,
Angola, Greece and the Soviet Union" to serve as a basis for purchase or
sale of their securities, or for correction of "significantly sub-standard per-
formance" in these areas by voting its shares, by submission of shareholder
proposals, or by consultation with management. The proposal received
the astonishingly high approval of more than 12 percent of the outstanding
shares of the Fund.18 Similarly, the Project on Corporate Responsibility has
requested that the same fund and eleven other major mutual funds include
social responsibility criteria relating to minimum environmental protection
and minority hiring standards in their investment policies.'8 9
A number of factors would appear to make mutual funds an unlikely
source of support for social reform. The interest of management and share-
holders in performance records necessarily emphasizes short-run economic
considerations. Appeals to shareholders as citizens, rather than as share-
holders, will be less effective. Further, since the funds are investors in other
businesses, and not directly conducting industrial or commercial operations
themselves, their activities do not produce issues of high public visibility.
They are, therefore, effectively insulated from participation in the sensitive
areas of social and environmental concern. Finally, because of the reduced
significance of institutional shareholders, the boards of directors of the
Funds are even less accountable to their shareholders than the boards of
the companies in which they invest. Thus, the ultimate decision is likely
to reflect the board's personal predilections, which, in almost all cases, are
likely to be sympathetic to a management faced with social reform proposals.
Moreover, in view of the preoccupation of such organizations and their
shareholders with performance records and the cumulative growth of port-
folio values, it is questionable, whatever the occasional exception, how many
boards can resist the evident pressures to respond solely to the short-run
economic considerations. Some developments indicate, however, that not-
138 Letters from Roy A. Schotland, Associate Dean of Georgetown University Law
School, to Fidelity Trend Fund, Inc., Mar. 12, 1971 and May 6, 1971; N.Y. Times, May 11,
1971, at 43, col. 1; Wall St. Journal, July 26, 1971, at 16, col. 10.
139 Wall St. Journal, Apr. 21, 1971, at 12, col. 3.
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withstanding the foregoing considerations, mutual fund shareholders-as
distinct from management-may be more prepared for recognition of social
and environmental factors in the management of the fund portfolio than
shareholders generally.
Reference has already been made to the shareholder vote on the pro-
posal before the Fidelity Trend Fund Annual Meeting. 140 The Dreyfus
Leverage Fund, holding 25,000 General Motors shares, polled its 127,000
shareholders on the Campaign GM Round II and Episcopal Church pro-
posals before the General Motors 1971 Annual Meeting. 28,580 shareholders
responded to the questionnaire. The proposals received a remarkable degree
of support: 45 percent of the valid votes were cast in favor of the Campaign
GM disclosure proposal, 39 percent in favor of its proposal pertaining to
shareholder nomination of an opposition slate of directors, and 30 percent
in favor of its proposal for special interest representation on the Board.
22 percent of the valid votes were in favor of the Episcopal Church proposal
pertaining to South Africa. 141
These unusual results-so different from the attitudes of General Motors
shareholders generally-may reflect a number of factors. The results of the
questionnaire may have been affected by the tally on a one-vote-per-holder
basis rather than one-vote-per-share. Furthermore, although the response
was unusually high for a questionnaire, it was much less than the response
to proxy solicitations generally. Perhaps, the motivations are different, and
the attitudes of those sufficiently interested to respond are not character-
istic of fund holders as a whole. Whatever the explanation, the results are
surprising. They suggest that if mutual fund voting is influenced by fund
shareholder attitudes, mutual funds may after all provide a base of support
for social reform proposals.
A number of new funds are now deliberately appealing to socially con-
scious investors through well-publicized plans employing social considera-
tions as one of the major elements influencing investment decision.142
140 See p. 452 supra.
141 Dreyfus Leverage Fund, Inc., Press Release, May 21, 1971.
142 See Bus. & Soc'y, Dec. 16, 1969, at 2.
For example, The Dreyfus Third Century Fund, Inc. states in a preliminary prospectus:
The Management of the Fund believes that private investment can be a positive force
to enhance and encourage further social progress in America .... It is the intention
of the Management . . . to limit its selection of investments to securities of those
companies which . . . show leadership or progress in the areas of, or have demon-
strated their concern for, protection and improvement of the environment and the
proper use of the nation's natural resources, consumer and occupational safety,
product purity and its effect on the environment, equal employment opportunity,
the health, education and housing demands of America or in other areas which help
to improve the quality of life ....
The Dreyfus Third Century Fund, Inc., Preliminary Prospectus 3 (May 7, 1971).
Other proposed mutual funds of this nature are the Social Dimensions Fund, which
proposes to invest in companies that will "contribute to society beyond satisfaction of
basic material needs and the traditional goal of maximum profit, to the exclusion of
all other ends," Bus. Week, May 1, 1971, at 29, and the First Spectrum Fund, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 5, 1971, at 58, col. 2.
The Morgan Guaranty Trust Company is similarly determining the feasibility of a
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Further, it is possible to envision the development of an awareness among
institutional investors that management sensitivity to social issues may
constitute an index of the superior type of businessman, whose decisions
in other areas may also be expected to reflect long-range vision. The com-
pany that displays social responsibility may thus attract future professional
investor support because of anticipated performance in the basic economic
aspects of the business arising from the broader horizons demonstrated in
the social area.
To increase the degree of possible support from such institutions, it has
been widely suggested that annual disclosure of the manner in which the
institution's shares were voted should be required. 43 A requirement of dis-
closure would unquestionably reinforce the pressure on the management
of funds to take a second look before voting in favor of corporate manage-
ment on social proposals.
Further, as Mr. Clarence Galston points out:
[T]he clamor for social awareness and action is widespread and ac-
celerating. It affects virtually every business venture. The institutional
investor cannot escape the eventual confrontation.14 4
Nevertheless, whatever the impact on other institutional investors, it may
be asked whether, in the end, the result will differ insofar as mutual funds
are concerned.
Insurance companies present a different problem because they are es-
sentially public institutions embracing millions of policyholders. They will
find it increasingly difficult to avoid responding to public pressures, par-
ticularly in the case of prominent public interest confrontations. Mutual
insurance companies are especially vulnerable in this regard. Indeed, it is
not difficult to visualize the politicalization of the mutual life insurance
company itself. If this were to occur, mutual life insurance companies could
play a leading role in this area.
B. Political Figures and Governmental Trust Funds
Another obvious source of support in the politicalization of the corpora-
tion is the traditional political process itself. Political figures recognizing the
mass appeal of the social proposals hasten to participate. For example, in
Campaign GM Round I Mayor Lindsay of New York City instructed the
trustees of New York City pension funds to vote their 162,000 General
Motors shares in favor of the Campaign GM proposals. 145 Other political
common-trust fund to invest in companies performing activities that are particularly
desirable socially. Am. Banker, June 9, 1971, at 1, 23.
The Project on Corporate Responsibility has also urged a dozen major mutual funds
to include social responsibility criteria in their investment policies. Wall St. Journal,
Apr. 21, 1971, at 12, col. 3.
143 See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 514; Galston, supra note 120, at 14; Landau, supra
note 80.
144 See Galston, supra note 120, at 10.
145 Project on Corporate Responsibility, Campaign GM Scorecard 1.
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support came from Mayor White of Boston,148 the San Francisco city pen-
sion fund and from Wisconsin and Iowa State funds.147
Further examples of the apparent usefulness of social reform campaigns
directed at corporations as means of furthering the political ambitions of
public figures are available. Six United States senators and twenty-two
congressmen endorsed Campaign GM Round 1.148 Shortly after the 1970
General Motors Annual Meeting, Presidential candidate, Senator Edmund
Muskie, who had earlier endorsed Campaign GM Round I, introduced the
Corporate Participation Bill,149 which was designed to limit the power of
the Securities and Exchange Commission to permit exclusion of shareholder
proposals from the management proxy statement under Rule 14a-8(c)(2). 1 0
More recently, Senator Metcalf of Montana, who had not endorsed Cam-
paign GM Round I, criticized the failure of universities to try to influence
racial, environmental, safety, and pricing policies of corporations, in terms
that follow closely the arguments of Campaign GM. 15'
C. The Small Shareholder
It has been already pointed out that the widespread distribution and
fragmentation of equity ownership has created a class of 31.9 million share-
holders, most of whom have a relatively petty economic stake in the enter-
prise in which they are theoretically part owners.152 For such small holders,
emphasis on social, rather than economic, corporate objectives will not
realistically result in any significant economic impact upon them as indi-
146 Id. at 2.
147 Id. at 1.
148 Id. at 2.
149 S. 4003, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
150 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(2) (1970).
151 N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1970, at 27, col. 2; Cong. Rec., Dec. 28, 1970, E 10733-57.
152 See p. 432 supra.
Professor Eisenberg makes much of the fact that the large number of shareholders
does not mean a significant widespread distribution of equity ownership measured by
value. See Eisenberg, The Legal Rules of Shareholders and Management in Modern
Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 44-46 (1969). Thus, as already noted, 79%o of
the General Motors shareholders own 100 shares or less. See note 67 supra. Similarly,
the 1970 census by the New York Stock Exchange on shareownership reveals the very
small investments of most shareholders:
Portfolio Size Number of Shareholders
Under $5,000 12,509,000
$5,000 to $9,999 6,398,000
$10,000 to $24,999 5,853,000
$25,000 to $49,999 2,826,000
$50,000 and over 2,934,000
N.Y. Stock Exchange, Shareownership--1970, 9 (1971). Thus almost 19 million, or approxi-
mately 60%, of the approximately 31 million American shareholders held shares with an
aggregate value under $10,000.
What we are not told is the aggregate value of the equity investments of the millions
of small shareholders. Although it clearly will not be as large as the widespread distribu-
tion of the shares would indicate, it is obviously most substantial. If, for example, the
holdings of these 19 million small shareholders were evenly distributed over the two
classes of portfolio size in question, the total value would be close to 80 billion dollars.
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viduals, even in those cases where the proposal involves economic cost to
the corporation; their stake is simply too small. This is not to suggest that
these small holders may not, in significant numbers, regard themselves as
owners, and may not indeed identify psychologically with the giant corpora-
tion in which they may hold a few shares. Many of such persons, of course,
will be hostile to any pressure that would divert the corporation from its
economic objectives. Thus, the little old lady from Dubuque will probably
vote with management. The point is that such a decision would rest on
psychological, not economic, influences. Nevertheless, as social attitudes
change, increasing numbers of small investors may find their own attitudes
changing, and may be more responsive to appeals on the political level,
such as those being made by Campaign GM and by the church groups.
The great number of shareholders constitute a significant power base
that cannot be ignored in political terms. In addition, there is evidence that
material voting patterns may develop from such a far-flung constituency.15 8
Finally, although by themselves the small shareholders are unorganized and
ineffective, with the leadership and organization of public interest groups
and the participation of church, university and other institutional holders,
they may, in the future, play an increasingly important role.
The potential base of support for social reform proposals is thus sub-
stantial. Whether or not a successful combination can ever be assembled to
outpoll management154 is not really the point. If social reformers can
achieve significant support in the balloting process, management will be
forced to respond to shareholder, as distinct from public, pressure. This
would be a vitally different response than to public opinion generally. As
time goes on, the use of the corporate balloting process as a method of
determining corporate policy may ultimately emerge as an end in itself,
and not simply as an interstitial publicity device in a campaign to influence
public opinion. At such point, politicalization of the corporation would
be complete.
VIII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SEC RULE 14a-8(c)
SEC Rule 14a-8(c) 155 plays a crucial role in the public interest proxy
contest, which is, in effect, a technique for the employment of the corporate
proxy solicitation machinery and the annual meeting as methods for ac-
complishing political-style confrontation, public debate of social issues be-
168 For example, resolutions to limit charitable contributions to "purposes in direct
furtherance of the business interests of this corporation," although running contrary to
the mainstream of corporate involvement and lacking any organization or promotional
campaign, received more than 9% of the votes cast at the 1971 annual meeting of share-
holders of Allied Chemical Corporation, Allied Chemical Corporation, Highlights of the
51st Annual Meeting and First Quarter Earnings Report 3 (June 10, 1971), 8.8% of the
votes cast at the Bethlehem Steel Corporation 1971 annual meeting, Bethlehem Steel
Corporation, Interim Report for Quarter Ended Mar. 31, 1971 (June 10, 1971), and more
than 8% of the votes cast at the 1970 annual meeting of American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company, American Tel. & Tel. Co., Proxy Statement 9-10 (Mar. 3, 1971).
154 Professor Schwartz doubts that this will occur. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 530.
155 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (1970).
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fore unwilling audiences and widespread exposure in the communications
media.156
Rule 14a-8(c) determines what shareholder proposals may be omitted by
management from its proxy solicitation, and would appear to be destined
as one of the major legal battlegrounds in the struggle to politicalize the
corporation. Rule 14a-8(c) is, in former SEC Chairman Ralph Demmler's
apt image, the screen to keep out shareholder proposals, leaving for deter-
mination only the policy question of how close the mesh should be. 5  The
decision of the SEC in Campaign GM Round I, to allow inclusion of only
two of the seven proposals submitted, illustrated the crucial significance of
the Rule, which Judge Tamm's opinion in the Medical Committee for
Human Rights158 case has catapulted into the forefront of legal attention. 5 9
Former Chairman Budge of the SEC announced in November, 1970 that
the Commission is studying possible changes in Rule 14a-8.160 Its ultimate
decision in this matter will fix the ground rules for future public interest
proxy contests,161 and presumably provide dearer standards for decision
concerning the social reform proposals management must include in the
corporate proxy solicitation. 6 2
IX. THE ALTERNATIVES OPEN TO MANAGEMENT
What can management do to reduce the impact of the politicalization of
the corporation that has occurred to date and that, in my opinion, is irre-
versible? The basic answer for business is to recognize the moral soundness
of most of the demands for social reform and the wisdom of responding
effectively to the social and environmental crisis. These must be the strategic
objectives of business. Such tactical measures as studies by groups, such
156 See p. 435 supra. See Alinsky, supra note 31, at 66.
157 Quoted in Schwartz, supra note 9, at 442-43.
158 Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
granted, 401 U.S. 973 (1971). In short, for the first time, a court held that "'[n]o-
action' responses by the SEC [to a claim] under rule 14a-8(d) are of a sufficiently
formal and final nature to warrant direct review .... 71 Colum. L. Rev. 344, 345 (1971).
159 In recent months, Rule 14a-8 and the Medical Committee case have been the sub-
ject of several comments or notes in law reviews. For example, Note, The SEC and
"No-Action" Decisions Under Proxy Rule 14a-8: The Case for Direct Judicial Review, 84
Harv. L. Rev. 835 (1971); Note, Proxy Rule 14a-8: Omission of Shareholder Proposals, 84
Harv. L. Rev. 700 (1971); 20 Am. U.L. Rev. 190 (1970); 71 Colum. L. Rev. 344 (1971); 45
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1098 (1970); 49 Tex. L. Rev. 322 (1971).
160 N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1970, at 37, col. 7; Wall St. Journal, Nov. 9, 1970, at 12, col. 1.
161 Chairman William J. Casey of the SEC has already indicated his attitude: "I don't
want to see corporate meetings turned into political forums." Wall St. Journal, June 18,
1971, at 5, col. 1.
162 In his valuable recent article reviewing Campaign GM, Professor Schwartz called
for five modifications of Rule 14a-8(c) to facilitate public interest proxy contests and for
appointment of a Commission study group to continue reexamination of the problem.
Briefly, his suggested modifications include: (1) repealing paragraph (c)(2) of Rule 14a-8, (2)
allowing the proponent of a proposal adequate space in management's proxy material to
support it, (3) easing the requirement that a proxy statement must be sent before or
with any solicitation, (4) expanding the use of proxy statements to provide more informa-
tion to shareholders, and (5) amending the procedures for reviewing Rule 14a-8 questions.
See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 520-29.
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as the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc., The Conference
Board and the Practising Law Institute, of the types of security procedures
to be adopted to prevent disruption at annual meetings possess only secon-
dary importance. 63
Business is already doing much, and must do much more, toward the
solution of the major social and environmental problems of the times and
in the struggle to deal with urban problems, poverty, race relations, product
safety and environmental abuse. The following four examples are illustra-
tive of the priority areas for management.
A. Increase in Philanthropic Support
As I have elsewhere pointed out,1 6 4 the extent of corporate expenditures
in the social sphere-as distinct from the environmental area-is essentially
limited by competitive factors. Only a few companies 65 devote amounts that
approach the 5 percent of pre-tax net income that the Internal Revenue Code
permits corporations to deduct for philanthropic contributions to qualified
tax-exempt organizations.66 Contributions of this nature enable business
to support the entire spectrum of agencies that are dealing with social
needs, as well as traditional areas such as higher education. In 1968, the
average for all corporate taxpayers was only 1.06 percent of pre-tax net in-
come, 6 7 and it is apparent that in the area of philanthropic efforts, most
businesses are still not prepared to expend amounts that will significantly
reduce earnings per share.6 8
In view of the magnitude of the problems of society, the campaign to
raise corporate contributions to a figure closer to the 5 percent of pre-tax
income deductible under the tax laws is one of the great challenges facing
business leadership. It is a matter of the general attitude of business with
respect to what constitutes an acceptable level of social costs. If enouih
courageous businessmen will take the lead to obtain acceptance within their
industries of progressively higher levels of support, business will be demon-
strating its concern for social betterment in unmistakable terms. Such action
will provide it with a considerably stronger position from which to respond
to the social reformers who would seek to alter the structure of business
itself.
There may be concern about the designation of recipients and about the
control exerted by business over the recipients, particularly if contributions
163 See Egerton, Shareholder Proposals as a Vehicle of Protest, The Conference Board
Record, Apr. 1971, at 48; Bus. Week, Feb. 13, 1971, at 86; The Conference Board,
Handling Protest at Annual Meetings (1971).
164 See Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Environment, The Conference
Board Record, Apr. 1971, at 42-44.
165 For example, Dayton Hudson Corp., Cummins Engine Co. and Carson-Pirie-Scott
Co.
166 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 170(b)(2).
167 Council for Financial Aid to Education, 1968 Survey of Corporation Support for
Higher Education (1968).
* 168 See the survey of 78 corporations, Fry Consultants Incorporated, Social Responsi-
bilities 4 (1970); C.W. Shaver & Co., Inc., Financing the Arts 3-4 (Jan. 1971).
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increase significantly. Concern of this nature has been expressed particularly
with respect to business support for higher education.16 9 One answer to such
concern is the "matching gift," where the recipient is chosen by the em-
ployee, not the employer.17 0 Extension of the "matching-gift" principle to
all tax-exempt philanthropic activities, and extension of the selection
process to include shareholders, as well as employees, would be a dramatic
acknowledgment of corporate responsibility to participate in the solution of
social problems. Further, if implemented on a broad enough scale, such a
program would provide a desperately needed additional source of support
for philanthropic activities generally.
B. Minority-Group Representation
In the area of race relations, the absence of blacks and other minority-
group members on the boards of directors of all but a few major American
corporations' 7' presents a serious social problem. Thus, thirteen West
Coast minority-group organizations bitterly criticized California's sixty-
seven largest corporations, 172 pointing out that not one of the 1,008 members
of their boards of directors was black or Mexican-American, and that only six
-most related to company executives-were women.' 78 Their goal is 25
percent minority board representation by 1972." 4
Similarly, in its report in February, 1971 to President Nixon, the National
Advisory Council on Minority Business emphasized that minority groups
were "all too frequently unrepresented when decisions are made in the
high councils of government or in corporate board rooms" and called for
appointment of persons from minority groups to the boards of directors of
the largest corporations. 7 5 The significance of this report is clear; it is a
recognition, by a Presidential Advisory Council that the large American
corporation is a quasi-political organization and that its executive circle,
like that of government itself, should include representatives of all sectors
of society. This view is a long-overdue recognition of the legitimate as-
pirations of deprived groups of Americans to participate in the important
decision-making centers of power in the American society. It is a conserva-
tive effort to widen the stake of deprived groups in the existing order.
Business must respond to retain the confidence of the society.
It is gratifying to note that leading corporations are responding, 76 and
169 Jackson, Book Review, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1292, 1294 (1955); Manning, Book Review,
67 Yale L.J. 1477, 1494-95 (1958).
170 A "matching-gift" plan is simple in operation. It is basically "a dollar-for-dollar
matching of an employee contribution [to a recipient of his choice] by the corporation."
Council for Financial Aid to Education, Inc., How to Aid Education 13 (1967).
171 Until comparatively recently, black representation on the board of a major corpor-
ation was almost non-existent.
172 The criticism is contained in a study by Responsible Corporate Action. Responsible
Corporate Action, Corporate Apartheid-California U.S.A. Style (Feb. 4, 1971).
173 Id. at 6.
174 Id. at 7. The New Republic described this objective as modest. The New Republic,
Feb. 20, 1971, at 10.
175 N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1971, § I, at 50, col. 3.
176 Minority-group members have been elected as members of the boards of directors of
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that the pattern of American corporate life is changing; major American
business is beginning to correct the injustices of the past. It is, however, ob-
vious that the process has just commenced. The strength of the pressures
for corporate reform will vary with the degree of business response.
C. The Role of "Outside" Directors
As noted, a significant number of the social reform proposals relate to
the organic structure of the corporation.1 77 They include such suggestions
as shareholder committees for corporate responsibility, inclusion of com-
peting slates of directors in the corporate proxy solicitation and election of
directors nominated by, or representing, employees, suppliers, consumers
and dealers. 178
It has been pointed out that specialized board representation presents
many serious problems.179 Nevertheless, such proposals do highlight the
importance of the "outside" director on the board, and the ultimate strength
of such proposals will undoubtedly depend on the extent to which so-called
"outside" directors introduce a different perspective into board deliberations
and decisions,18 0 and in practice, as well as in theory, truly function as public
major corporations. For example, blacks have been elected to the boards of Arthur D.
Little, Inc., Chase Manhattan Bank, College Retirement Equities Fund, Columbia Broad-
casting, Commonwealth Edison, Equitable Life Assurance Society, First National City
Bank, First Pennsylvania Corporation, General Motors, Girard Trust Bank, Great At-
lantic & Pacific Tea, International Business Machines, Metropolitan Life Insurance,
Michigan Consolidated Gas, Pan American Airways, Potomac Electric Power, Prudential
Life Insurance Company, Scott Paper, Standard Oil of Ohio, Twentieth Century Fox,
Westinghouse Broadcasting, Westinghouse Electric and W.T. Grant. Women have been
elected to the boards of The Chase Manhattan Bank, First Pennsylvania Corporation,
H.J. Heinz Co., International Business Machines, Jewel Tea, North East Utilities, Quaker
Oats and Scott Paper.
177 See pp. 434-35 supra.
178 The question of desirability of specialized representation on boards of directors is
a relatively novel one in the United States. See Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the
Rule of Law, in The Corporation in Modern Society 41 (E. Mason ed. 1959). The subject
has been discussed in England, see, e.g., M. Fogarty, Company and Corporation-One
Law? 1-38 (1965); G. Goyder, The Responsible Company (1961), and is a reality, at least
as far as employees are concerned, in Germany, see M. Fogarty, Company and Corporation-
One Law? 89-108 (1965); Frame, Worker Participation in Company Management with
Particular Reference to Codetermination in the Federal Republic of Germany, 5 Vict.
U.L. Rev. 417 (1970); Steefel & Falkenhausen, The New German Stock Corporation Law,
52 Cornell L.Q. 518, 537-39 (1967); Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Per-
spectives from the German, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 25 (1966). The Draft Statute for a European
Company proposed by the Commission of the European Economic Communities follows
the German model in providing for worker representation on the supervisory board.
Commission of the European Communities, Proposed Statute for the European Company,
art. 137(1). Supp. to Bull. 8-1970 of the European Communities. See Sanders, The European
Company on Its Way, 8 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 29 (1971).
179 See Eisenberg, supra note 152, at 16-21; Vagts, supra note 178, at 48-78.
180 Thus in announcing the election of Dr. Paul N. Ylvisaker to the Board of Directors
of Dayton Hudson Corporation, the corporation noted; "One of the nation's leading
social scientists, Dr. Ylvisaker is professor of public affairs and urban planning at Princeton
University and was New Jersey's first Commissioner of Community Affairs. We believe he
brings to the board a valuable non-business perspective that will help the Corporation
respond appropriately to the changing forces at work in society." Dayton Hudson Corpora-
tion, Quarterly Report 1971, Inside Front Cover.
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directors. Where "outside" directors are not truly independent of manage-
ment, such as in the case of corporate counsel, investment bankers or
commercial bankers, all of whom are vitally interested in preserving busi-
ness opportunities for their own firms, and are, therefore, not in a position
to tangle with management, they are not free to represent the public-either
the limited public of the shareholders or the wider public of the community
generally.
Business must recognize these wider responsibilities and have genuine
"outside" directors, free to represent public attitudes and expectations. If
it fails to do so, it may face increasing pressure for "outside" directors who
would represent not the interest of public shareholders or the general pub-
lic, but the specialized interest of employees, consumers, suppliers or deal-
ers or similar groups.
D. The Environment
In the environmental field, the intensity of public demand for corrective
action has reached such overwhelming proportions that business has lost
much of its freedom of choice. It must respond vigorously. Weyerhauser
Company provides an excellent example of what may be accomplished by
businessmen in this area. Even though it is engaged in the paper and pulp
industry, which faces some of the most difficult air and water pollution
problems in the American economy, Weyerhauser has received outstanding
recognition for its affirmative efforts. Organizations as diverse as Business
Week, in its 1970 Awards for Business Citizenship,sl The Council on
Economic Priorities, in its study of the paper and pulp industry 82 and the
Sports Foundation,18 3 have singled it out for commendation, with emphasis
on the record of achievement, not upon its remaining unsolved problems.
This illustrates how business cannot only prevail in the battle for public
opinion, but can achieve favorable recognition, provided that, in the words
of President George Weyerhauser, both management and shareholders are
prepared to sacrifice "short-term gain for long-term appreciation." 18 4
X. CONCLUSION
Business can only prosper by being part of a healthy society, and can only
preserve its present degree of independence from public control by partici-
pation in the solution of social and environmental problems in accordance
with public expectations and demands. This can be accomplished by join-
ing in the battle for social justice: the struggle against poverty, race and
sex discrimination, environmental abuse, urban blight, and by having a
significant number of independent directors reflecting public attitudes on its
boards. Business has no alternative but to respond to the public demand. It
must operate in the light of the realities of the times. In short, it is in part a
181 See Bus. Week, Mar. 6, 1971, at 51, 54.
182 The Council on Economic Priorities, Paper Profits: Pollution in the Pulp and
Paper Industry (1971).
183 Id. at X-3.
184 Bus. Week, Mar. 6, 1971, at 54.
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW.
political institution. The only question that remains is how far political-
ization will proceed.
In this connection, the statement of the Board of Trustees of The Rocke-
feller Foundation, issued in explanation of its position on the Campaign
GM Round I proposals, deserves the most serious attention, both because of
its eloquence, and because of the composition of the Board which included
such prominent members of the business community as John D. Rockefeller
III, C. Douglas Dillon, Robert Roosa, Frank Stanton and Thomas Watson.
The Rockefeller Foundation stated that:
[T]he corporations of America must assert an unprecedented order of
leadership in helping to solve the social problems of our time. ...
-What is needed from business today is leadership which is courageous,
wise and compassionate, which is enlightened in its own and the pub-
lic's interest and which greets change with an open mind.18 5
An extensive degree of politicalization of the corporation has already
occurred. The pressures for further politicalization will continue to increase
and may ultimately change the structure and objectives of American cor-
porate enterprise, unless business has the wisdom and strength to respond
to the moral imperatives of our times and to display, in the language of
the Rockefeller Foundation trustees, an "unprecedented order of leader-
ship in helping to solve the social problems of our time."'18 The response of
business management to the challenge will be the major factor in determin-
ing whether the American corporation will survive in its present form.
185 Time, June 1, 1970, at 55.
186 Id.
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